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Aiding Lay Decision Making Using a
Cognitive Competencies Approach
A. J. Maule 1* and Simon Maule 1,2
1 Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, 2 Linstock Communications, London, UK
Two prescriptive approaches have evolved to aid human decision making: just in time
interventions that provide support as a decision is being made; and just in case
interventions that educate people about future events that they may encounter so
that they are better prepared to make an informed decision when these events occur.
We review research on these two approaches developed in the context of supporting
everyday decisions such as choosing an apartment, a financial product or a medical
procedure. We argue that the lack of an underlying prescriptive theory has limited
the development and evaluation of these interventions. We draw on recent descriptive
research on the cognitive competencies that underpin human decisionmaking to suggest
new ways of interpreting how and why existing decision aids may be effective and
suggest a different way of evaluating their effectiveness. We also briefly outline how our
approach has the potential to develop new interventions to support everyday decision
making and highlight the benefits of drawing on descriptive research when developing
and evaluating interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
Simon (1955) suggests that people do not make decisions in ways outlined by the rational model.
He argues that the computational demands of implementing the model far exceed people’s limited
capacity for thinking. To overcome this problem he suggests people use simpler thinking strategies
such as satisficing—choosing the first option that is reasonable rather than the one that is best.
This work has provided the context for developments in both descriptive research explaining how
people actually make decisions and prescriptive research outlining how we can help people make
better decisions.
Although these two areas of research started from a common base, over time they have diverged.
On the one hand descriptive research has increasingly focused on the thinking and reasoning
processes underpinning human decision making using laboratory based methods derived from
cognitive psychology and experimental economics (Weber and Johnson, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).
On the other hand, prescriptive research has increasingly focused on developing methods for
improving decision making drawing heavily on the rational model and management science
(Watson, 1992; French et al., 2009).
This divergence has reduced the extent to which insights and developments in one area have
influenced work in the other. In this article we outline how recent descriptive research on the
cognitive competencies that underlie human decision making can provide a new way of developing
and evaluating prescriptive approaches designed to improve human decision making. Our focus is
on supporting important everyday decisions taken by members of the public such as choosing a
house or apartment, a financial product, a medical procedure or whether to sue an employer for
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FIGURE 1 | Part of a cognitive map for a decision whether to sue an employer following an accident at work (arrows indicate casual links).
negligence following an accident at work. We do not consider
support for experts or for strategic decisions taken in
organizations. However, we believe that the suggestions
outlined in this article have the potential to be applied in these
other contexts.
We begin by reviewing prescriptive decision research,
identifying the major approaches and limitations in this work.
Then we briefly review descriptive decision research and consider
the extent to which it can help to overcome some of the problems
with prescriptive approaches. Finally, we provide suggestions
about future research.
PRESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH
Two prescriptive approaches have evolved to support human
decision making: just in time interventions that provide support
as a decision is actually being made; and just in case interventions
that educate people about events that they may meet in the future
so that they are better prepared to make an informed decision
when these events occur.
Just in Time Interventions
Initially, just in time interventions involved helping people make
decisions in ways that more closely follow the rational model
(Raiffa, 1968). This approach, usually called Decision Analysis,
assumes that all decisions can be reduced to the same basic
elements—alternatives, states of the world, outcomes, utilities
and probabilities (French et al., 2009). Having derived these
elements it is possible to calculate the value to the decision maker
of each option. The decision maker then chooses the option
with the highest value, usually expressed in terms of subjective
expected utility (SEU).
Most applications of Decision Analysis support strategic
decision making in organizations (Clemen and Kwit, 2001).
These applications involve working with senior members of
an organization over several days in facilitated sessions using
a range of support techniques. These support techniques have
been developed to overcome the difficulties people have when
formulating problems in terms of the basic elements of Decision
Analysis. We provide a brief review of two such techniques,
cognitive mapping and decision trees (for a more complete
review, see French et al., 2009).
Cognitive mapping facilitates people’s understanding of a
decision problem in terms of their beliefs about the causal
relationships between key factors that can affect decision
outcomes. In Figure 1 we present part of a map of an everyday
legal decision concerning whether, following an accident at work,
a person should sue an employer and if so whether to take legal
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advice before doing so. The model highlights a range of legal,
social and financial factors that can affect how a decision may
turn out. Decision makers are prompted to take account of these
factors when developing and evaluating their model of a decision
problem.
Decision trees are fundamental to Decision Analysis and
involve modeling the options available to a decision maker,
all the possible outcomes that may occur having chosen an
option, the value the decision maker places on these outcomes
and the likelihoods with which each outcome may occur. This
information is used to calculate the overall value of each option in
terms of its SEU, thereby helping people make decisions in ways
that accord with the rational model. In Figure 2 we illustrate a
decision tree for the same legal problem used above to illustrate
cognitive mapping. Having drawn the tree the decision maker
would determine the subjective value (utility) of each outcome
(represented as ellipses in the tree), the probabilities associated
with each outcome (the outputs from the circles in the tree)
and then calculate the SEU of each option by summing the
products of each outcome utility and probability associated with
this option. French et al. (2009) outline a broad range of methods
for deriving the key elements of a decision tree.
Both techniques have the potential to help people develop a
more elaborate representation of a decision problem. Limitations
in working memory capacity make it difficult for an individual
to develop, retain and evaluate a complex model of a decision
problem unaided. Drawing a map or tree on paper or in a
computer frees up capacity for other key cognitive activities such
as assessing the adequacy of the problem representation and
evaluating choice options.
Phillips (1984) suggests that a primary purpose of Decision
Analysis is to develop a requisite decision model of the problem
in hand, i.e., an internal representation of the problem whose
form and content are sufficient for determining choice. Although
this suggestion is developed in the context of groups of
senior managers making strategic decisions in organizational
settings, we believe it is also relevant for supporting everyday
decisions. Phillips argues that models capture value judgments
and their relative importance about the various advantages and
disadvantages of choice options. Drawing on Harré (1976),
Phillips suggests a model is a “small measure, a lesser reality
....... of the problem in hand” (pp. 33). It is simpler than reality,
e.g., those aspects thought not to be important are omitted
and complex relationships are often just approximated. He
distinguishes between the subject and the source of a model.
The subject reflects the decision maker’s understanding of the
problem and dictates the content of the model. The source is
the rational model, leading is the rational model leading the
decisionmaker to structure the content in terms of decision trees,
cognitive maps and the like, and using such elements as acts,
outcomes and consequences.
A decision maker’s model of a problem evolves during
Decision Analysis through group discussion and sensitivity
analysis. Formally, sensitivity analysis involves changing one
or more assessments either to take account of disagreements
between individual group members or simply to reflect a
broader range of possible values given that assessments
are always approximate and uncertain. We believe that in
everyday situations, sensitivity analysis can be implemented by
encouraging a decision maker to think about how their choice
might be affected if their current assessments were changed, e.g.,
a particular outcome was better or worse than their original
assessment. Phillips argues that while decision makers have a
sense of unease about the current model, it is not requisite
so requires further development. Thus, sensitivity analysis
continues until decision makers feel that no new intuitions about
the problem are emerging and their sense of unease about the
adequacy of the model is low. At this stage the model is said to
be requisite. It is important to recognize that requisite decision
models are generated, not plucked out of people’s heads.
Two areas of research suggest that Decision Analysis may
be relevant in everyday decision situations. First, Hodgkinson
et al. (1999) show that cognitive mapping, a technique commonly
used in Decision Analysis, reduces the framing bias. Since
this bias is thought to occur commonly in everyday situations
techniques such as cognitive mapping may have an important
role in improving everyday decision making. Second, these
kinds of techniques have already been applied successfully
in one domain of everyday decision making concerned with
health and medicine (see Bekker et al., 1999; O’Connor
et al., 1999, 2009, for extensive reviews). These interventions
provide evidence-based information to help patients make better
health decisions. They involve presenting information about the
relevant health condition; the available options; the benefits,
harms and probabilities associated with each outcome; and any
scientific uncertainties. This information is often presented in a
decision tree (Bekker et al., 2004).
However, several problems need to be overcome if these
techniques are to be used in everyday situations. First, people
need to learn how to use the techniques and interpret their
outputs. Hodgkinson et al. (1999) demonstrate that this
may be achieved in a relatively short time period. Second,
research indicates that people may be insensitive to the
adequacy/completeness of their maps and trees. Fischhoff et al.
(1978) showed that people are poor at assessing the completeness
of a fault tree diagram associated with starting a car (fault trees
are very similar to decision trees) and are insensitive to missing
information. This highlights the danger of people basing their
decisions on inadequate trees and maps. One possible way to
resolve these two problems is to give the public pre-drawn maps
and trees that experts in the area have developed and evaluated.
This approach has been successful in medical/health situations
(Bekker et al., 2004) though it remains untested in other everyday
domains.
Third, people often find decision trees difficult because they
involve generating numbers to capture utilities and probabilities.
One way of resolving this is to use qualitative decision trees where
people simply list the pros and cons of each outcome rather than
evaluate each quantitatively.
Finally, evaluation of the effectiveness of the just in time aids
remains a major problem. We discuss this issue in greater detail
next.
Effectiveness of Just in Time Interventions
Applications of Decision Analysis in organizational settings are
difficult to evaluate since they involve a unique decision, so
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FIGURE 2 | A decision tree for a decision whether to sue an employer following an accident at work.
there is no way of comparing outcomes with similar decisions
not supported by Decision Analysis. Applications in health
and medical settings have been evaluated in several different
ways. O’Connor et al. (2009) review a large body of research
showing that, in comparison to patients following standard
medical procedures, those using just in time decision aids have
greater knowledge about their medical condition, more accurate
assessments of the probabilities of treatment outcomes and more
likely to draw on their values when making the decision. In
addition, patients using these aids experience less decisional
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conflict, feel more informed and involved in making the decision,
are less likely defer making a decision and often express
more satisfaction with decision outcomes. These differences are
assumed to reflect better decision making. We evaluate this
assumption in greater detail in a later section of this article.
Despite the difficulties outlined in this section of the article we
believe that techniques such as decision trees and cognitive maps
have considerable potential for supporting everyday decision
making.
Just in Case Interventions
This approach involves educating people about events that they
may encounter in the future so that they are better prepared
to make an informed decision if and when these events occur.
Research has investigated this approach in the legal, financial
services and medical/health domains.
Legal Services Interventions
In the legal domain, just in case interventions are designed to
improve the public’s knowledge about the law as a means of
improving their legal decision making. For example, Mackie
(2013) draws on research identifying key aspects of the law
thought necessary to help people make more informed legal
decisions, e.g., ability to recognize and understand the legal
aspects of everyday problems and knowing where to look for
relevant legal information. She designed and delivered a series
of seminars to cover these key aspects. Questionnaires given
to participants pre and post seminar attendance show the
intervention increased understanding of legal situations and gave
participants greater confidence that they understood their rights
and where to seek legal advice. However, we cannot assess the
long-term benefits of the intervention since its impact on later
legal decision making was not investigated.
Financial Services Interventions
Research on just in case interventions in the financial services
domain has occurred as a response to findings showing very
low levels of financial literacy in the general public (Atkinson
et al., 2006). This lack of financial literacy is assumed to be a
major cause of poor financial decisionmaking, e.g., failure to plan
effectively for retirement (van Rooij et al., 2011). Interventions
to improve financial literacy have included providing relevant
information as inserts in pay packets, newsletters, seminars,
individual consultations, education programs and information
through the internet.
Reviews have concluded that evaluations taken at the end
of these interventions are generally positive with participants
demonstrating a better understanding of financial issues and
indicating that they intend to change their behaviors in the
ways advocated by the intervention. However, their impact
on later financial decision making is disappointingly low. For
example, Fernandes et al. (2014) showed a very small but
statistically significant positive effect of financial literacy on
the quality of decisions about planning for retirement, saving
and avoiding high levels of debt. However, the review also
showed that financial literacy levels were not determined by
whether or not people had been exposed to a just in case
intervention. This suggests that financial literacy is important
but is unaffected by just in case interventions. De Meza
et al. (2008) draw similar conclusions from their review.
Taken together these findings suggest there is little evidence
that just in case interventions improve financial decision
making.
Health and Medical Domain
Just in case interventions in health and medical domains have
involved education programs covering such issues as heart
disease, diabetes, AIDS, safe sex, and avoiding the dangers of
tobacco, alcohol, drugs and obesity. An important outcome from
this work resonates with the findings from the legal and financial
domains—simply providing relevant knowledge is rarely enough
to bring about the intended changes in future decision making
(Winkleby, 1994). These failures have led to a new generation of
interventions that incorporate ideas from a range of social science
theories concerning behavioral change. The theories drawn on
mostly are the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Health Belief
Model, the Theory of Planned Behavior, Social Learning Theory,
Social Cognitive Theory and the Transtheoretical model—see
Glanz et al. (2008) for short reviews of these theories and how
they are applied in health settings. Each theory highlights key
factors that need to be taken into account if an intervention is to
be effective. A detailed description of the theories and how they
have been applied to facilitate health interventions lies outside the
scope of this article. However, next we provide some examples of
the factors that these theories highlight as crucial if interventions
are to succeed.
First, the Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974) highlights the
importance of overcoming barriers that limit or prevent a
person choosing the most appropriate option. For example, the
best option may be rejected if it is perceived as unpleasant,
inconvenient or time consuming to enact or in danger of
revealing an unwanted outcome. Identifying and managing
these barriers is crucial for developing effective just in case
interventions. Second, the Health Belief Model highlights the fact
that people often need a prompt indicating the need to initiate
or the timeliness of the prescribed action. Without the prompt
people may simply overlook the opportunity for choosing to
act at all. Third, these theories highlight the importance of
people believing that they have sufficient efficacy or personal
control to be able to enact successfully the chosen option
and receive the benefits from doing so. Finally, the Theory
of Reasoned Action (Armitage and Conner, 2001) highlights
the importance of behavioral intentions—an indication of an
individual’s readiness to perform a particular action. The strength
of behavioral intentions depend upon a person’s own attitude
toward performing the behavior and subjective norms relating
to whether people held in high regard are perceived to approve
or disapprove of that behavior. This highlights the need to take
account of the broader social context and the influence that
others have on effective decision making.
This body of work shows that simply identifying and
communicating health andmedical information thought relevant
by experts is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure that just in case
interventions decision aids are effective.
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Effectiveness of Just in Case Interventions
Amajor problem underlying just in case interventions is the lack
of an underlying prescriptive theory specifying what information
needs to be presented and how this should be communicated.
Instead interventions are usually developed ad hoc based on what
domain experts consider appropriate based on their knowledge
of the area. As indicated above, to be effective these interventions
have had to move beyond this atheoretical approach by drawing
on theory and research on the social psychology of behavioral
change. Recently two other bodies of theory have been drawn on
to specify the information to be included in an intervention and
how it should be presented. First, the mental models approach
(Morgan et al., 2002) highlights the crucial role of user’s own
knowledge and understanding and the importance of specifying
what is needed to supplement this and correct any errors. This
approach involves comparing the mental models of the situation
held by experts and the lay public, determining the kinds of
decisions that people actually have to make and then identifying
the knowledge gaps that are in most need of filling or correcting.
Research indicates that the mental models approach is effective
and has the potential to improve decisions taken months after
the intervention has been completed (Downs et al., 2004).
Second, most just in case approaches are developed on the
assumption that the primary driver of poor decision making
is a lack of appropriate knowledge; these approaches present
the additional information thought needed. This overlooks key
psychological factors that determine whether and how knowledge
is used when people are actually making a decision. These factors
have been discussed in some detail in descriptive research. For
example, people exposed to a just in case intervention may
learn that it is prudent to save for retirement or to give up
smoking but this may not be effective at the point of choice
due to such psychological factors as a high need for immediate
rather than delayed gratification (Frederick et al., 2002); or the
way that options are framed at the point of choice (Edwards
et al., 2001). Identifying and managing these psychological
factors is crucial to the success of just in case approaches. This
suggests that just in case interventions may need to draw on
prescriptive insights from just in time approaches that indicate
how newly acquired information is processed at the point of
choice.
EVALUATION
The lack of a universal prescriptive theory underpinning just
in time and just in case approaches makes evaluation of
interventions problematic. Most just in time interventions use
the rational model of decision making as their underlying
prescriptive theory. From this viewpoint an intervention is
effective if it leads people to choose the option that maximizes
SEU. Although the rational model specifies very precisely the
terms and calculations needed to determine SEU it does not
specify the method for deriving these. As indicated earlier, just
in time interventions have used a broad range of techniques
for deriving key terms. However, it is not possible to directly
evaluate the efficacy of these techniques since there is no way
of establishing the “true” probabilities and utilities against which
comparisons can be made.
These difficulties have led to a range of other evaluation
methods—see Ubel (2013) for a review of these in health settings.
One method involves assessing whether those exposed to the
intervention know more about the decision situation and the
alternatives that are on offer. The assessment usually takes place
immediately after the intervention has been completed. Greater
knowledge is assumed to lead to more effective decision making.
Ubel is critical of this measure because it ignores whether and, if
so, how people use this extra information at the point of choice.
For example, forgetting may lead to crucial differences between
what people recall at the end of an intervention and what is
available in the future when they actually take a decision. In
addition, we indicated in the previous section that this approach
overlooks the possibility that the primary reason people are
making sub-optimal decisions is not a lack of information but
due instead to how this information is processed.
A further problem with evaluations based on user’s knowledge
of the situation is revealed by research showing that more
information can change people’s perceptions and intuitive
feelings of how knowledgeable they are (Alba and Hutchinson,
2000). Hadar et al. (2013) show that giving people complex rather
than simple information about investment options increases how
much they know, i.e., their objective knowledge, but may lead
them to feel that the situation is much more complicated than
they initially thought, i.e., decrease their subjective knowledge.
Decreases in subjective knowledge can have a detrimental effect
by reducing a person’s propensity to make a decision at all in
uncertain situations given their lack of confidence about their
knowledge and understanding of that situation. Conversely, if the
presented information is too simple people tend to underestimate
the complexity of the situation so increasing their subjective
knowledge which, in turn, may lead to a lack of caution and a
tendency to act when it is not appropriate to do so. These findings
challenge the appropriateness of simply assuming that increases
in objective knowledge lead to better decision making.
A second evaluation method uses reductions in decision
conflict as ameasure of intervention success. Ubel argues that this
overlooks the fact that decisional conflict is often functional and
induces search for additional information. For example, people
presented with only the possible positive outcomes of a decision
option may show little conflict when choosing that option yet be
making a poor decision given they remain ignorant of possible
negative outcomes.
The two measures described above are the ones used most
often in health related areas, though Ubel (2013) outlines several
other possible measures based on showing that those exposed to
the intervention are happier with their decisions or take longer to
make the decision.
Yates et al. (2003) take a rather different approach by asking
people to identify the defining characteristics of a good decision.
Their findings show that people take account of a broader range
of factors than those currently used to evaluate interventions.
For example, people indicate that good decisions occur when
the outcome is better than expected; the outcome is better than
would have occurred if another option had been chosen; is less
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1884
Maule and Maule Lay Decision Aiding and Thinking Competencies
costly in terms of time, money, cognitive effort; the process used
overcomes difficulties experienced on previous occasions. These
factors have yet to be used for evaluating just in time or just in
case interventions.
Evaluation remains a major problem for both just in time
and just in case interventions. In later sections of this article we
propose an alternative approach based on recent developments
in descriptive decision research.
DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH
From a descriptive standpoint, Simon’s suggestions have
provided the foundation for what is now a large body of research
on the thinking and reasoning that underpins human judgment
and decision making. One important feature of this research is
the distinction between different types of thinking. Although the
precise nature of these different types is contested (see Evans,
2008, 2010) in this article we distinguish two types: Type 1
which is broadly quick, intuitive, requires little mental effort to
implement and is often based on affect, i.e., how options make
people feel; and Type 2 which is analytical, deliberative, operates
under conscious control and requires a good deal of mental effort
to implement.
A very broad range of different forms of Type 1 thinking,
often called heuristics, have been identified (Gilovich et al.,
2002). These heuristics are functional in that they make complex
problems tractable and allow people to resolve problems rather
than becoming paralyzed by information overload. However,
heuristics have the potential for error and bias though this is
certainly not the case in all situations (Gigerenzer and Brighton,
2011). Errors and biases are classified in two ways. Failures of
coherence occur when people violate a basic normative principle
such as expressing probabilities of all possible outcomes that
sum to more or less than one, or reversing their preference for
options following trivial changes in the ways that options are
described. Failures of correspondence occur when people make
factual errors such as assuming that traveling by plane is riskier
than traveling by car when, in reality, the opposite is the case.
This body of descriptive research has given rise to two areas
of prescriptive research designed to improve everyday decision
making. We critically review these two areas and then outline
a third area that we believe has more potential for supporting
everyday decision making.
De-biasing
Arkes (1991) and Larrick (2004) review research on debiasing
human judgment and decision making developed by identifying
and then correcting faulty thinking. Arkes (1991) classifies
known errors and biases into three categories and then suggests
interventions that address distinctive aspects of each. First,
strategy based errors involve the use of sub-optimal strategies,
e.g., satisficing rather than maximizing expected utility. He
suggests debiasing by increasing task involvement, i.e., making
the outcomes more personally relevant, or by asking decision
makers to justify their choices. Larrick (2004) points out that this
approach can only be effective if people actually know the optimal
strategy for the task in hand in the first place. In everyday decision
making this is unlikely to be the case.
Second, association based errors are underpinned by Type
1 thinking such as semantic memory priming. These errors
occur when initially presented/accessed information biases the
information focused on later in a judgment or decision process.
This leads people to over-rely on narrow/biased samples of
evidence (Larrick, 2004). For example, people who are first
asked to imagine a particular outcome of an event later tend
to judge this outcome as more likely to occur than those not
asked to imagine the outcome (Gregory et al., 1982). Imagining
primes outcome related memories making these more available
and memories linked to alternative outcomes less available, i.e.,
increasing the availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
Arkes argues that debiasing association errors is tricky—
simply offering incentives for good performance is ineffective.
Similarly, telling people about the bias and not to succumb
to it is also ineffective (Fischhoff, 1975). A more promising
approach involves structuring a decision maker’s thinking in
ways that counteract association errors. For example, “consider
the opposite thinking” involves asking people to engage in
counterfactual thinking—thinking about the reasons why initial
judgments might be wrong (Mussweiler et al., 2000). In the
example above this might involve asking people to imagine a
broad range of possible outcomes before judging the likelihood
that a particular one will actually occur.
Third, psychophysically based errors are associated with the
Prospect Theory value function describing how people evaluate
decision outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). One example
of a psychophysically based error, the framing bias, occurs when
people reverse their preferences for options depending upon
whether information about these options is presented in terms
of gains or losses. This means that choices are dependent on
how information is presented rather than people’s underlying
preferences. Arkes argues that debiasing can be achieved by
getting people to engage in more elaborated thinking prior to
choice, e.g., framing the problems in terms of both gains and
losses. Although there is some support for this view (Hodgkinson
et al., 1999) overall the evidence is equivocal (LeBoeuf and Shafir,
2003). These contradictory findings are due in part to researchers
confusing two different aspects of framing concerning how
information is presented and how that information is then
represented by the decision maker (Maule and Villejoubert,
2007).
Overall, there is some evidence that debiasing may be an
effective way of overcoming known errors and biases. However,
there are three reasons why this approach may be limited for
supporting everyday decision making.
First, the evidence is largely derived from laboratory studies.
There is a paucity of research investigating the effectiveness
of these techniques outside the laboratory so their impact on
everyday decision making remains uncertain.
Second, debiasing techniques are designed to overcome bias
associated with the use of specific heuristics, e.g., “consider
the opposite thinking” designed to overcome association based
errors. In everyday decisions it is often difficult to determine
which, if any heuristic, is underpinning decision making. What
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1884
Maule and Maule Lay Decision Aiding and Thinking Competencies
is needed is a system for classifying and analyzing common
everyday decision problems in terms of the heuristics people are
using. This would allow us to predict where particular debiasing
procedures are likely to be effective. A similar point is made
by Larrick (2004). Without this it is difficult to know which
technique people should use and how it should be evaluated.
Third, Larrick (2004) argues that many biases such as
escalation of commitment are determined by many factors
making it less likely that they are amenable to one specific
debiasing technique
Nudging Effective Decision Making
Nudge is the term used to describe a relatively new way of
improving everyday decision making (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). Although nudging is similar to debiasing in that it draws
heavily on descriptive research, the underlying approach is very
different. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest there are situations
where there is general agreement about the “desired” or socially
acceptable decision to take in a situation, e.g., choosing healthy
eating options, to exercise frequently or to save for old age.
Nudging involves applying descriptive research to structure
decision situations in ways that make it more likely that people
choose the socially desirable option while still leaving them
free to choose whatever they wish. Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
argue that, in general, the decision context, or what they call
the cognitive architecture, can be structured in ways that induce
a particular mode of thinking; this leads people to choose the
socially desirable option. For example, research on the default
effect shows that if people are given a particular option (option
A) and then given the possibility of either sticking with this
option or switching to an alternative (option B) they have a strong
tendency to stick with what they already have, i.e., the default
option A. This preference for option A is much stronger than
occurs when they are given a straight choice between the two
options.
The default effect is currently being used in the UK to nudge
everyday decisions concerning pensions. UK employees who do
not have a pension are being automatically opted into a new
work-based pension scheme, though they can opt out if they want
to. Currently the average opt in rate to the pension is 92%—much
higher than would be expected if employees were given a straight
choice between opting in and opting out1.
Dolan et al. (2012) describe a broad range of nudging
techniques derived from theory and research in cognitive and
social psychology. These techniques have been shown to be
effective in influencing people to take the socially desirable option
in everyday decisions in such domains as health, finance and the
environment (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Thaler, 2015).
Despite the success of nudging techniques there are important
limitations for helping people make better decisions in the
kinds of everyday situations we are interested in. First, nudging
depends on being able to designate one option as socially
desirable for everyone. Even where nudging is thought to
be effective there are dissenting voices challenging the idea
1http://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/includes/public/news/NE
ST-Corporation-and-NEST-Scheme-annual-reports-and-accounts-2014_15.html
that it is possible to identify a single option as socially
desirable for everyone (Guala and Mittone, 2015). This is even
more problematic for the everyday decision situations we are
interested where the optimal choice is likely to be different for
different individuals given differences in their values. Second,
the technique has been criticized for being overly paternalistic—
persuading people to choose what others have designated as the
optimal choice rather than allowing people freedom to choose in
ways that accord with their own beliefs and values.
Cognitive Competency and Decision
Making
An interesting new development in descriptive research focuses
on key differences between people in terms of the cognitive
competencies and skills underpinning their decision making,
investigating how these impact on decision outcomes. From this
standpoint competence concerns “the decision-making skills
people need to improve their real-world decisions and to obtain
better life decision outcomes” (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012a, pp.
329).
In this article we are interested in cognitive competencies
associated with components of human memory. Previous
research has shown that memory processes play an important
role in human judgment and decision making (Dougherty and
Hunter, 2003; Reyna et al., 2003; Parker and Fischhoff, 2005;
Del Missier et al., 2010, 2012, 2013). One important stream
of this work has investigated the extent to which individual
differences in memory related cognitive competencies can
explain differences between people in terms of their propensity
to fall foul of a series of well-established biases commonly
revealed when people use heuristic forms of thinking. Three sets
of memory related cognitive competencies have been identified
that highlight differences between people in terms of: complex
processing ability associated with working memory; knowledge
associated with semantic memory; and experience associated
with episodic memory.
Del Missier et al. (2013) argue that some cognitive biases
are revealed in judgment and decision making tasks that make
heavy demands on working memory, making it likely that the
propensity to fall foul of these biases is linked to complex
processing abilities associated with this memory component.
Other biases occur in tasks that make demands on knowledge
stored in semantic memory or experience stored in episodic
memory making it likely that the propensity to reveal these
biases is linked to differences in competencies associated with
knowledge and experience. There are six areas of this work that
are relevant to the current article.
First, research has shown that individuals with better working
memory and executive control processes are better at resisting
the framing bias, i.e., not allowing trivial changes in the wording
of decision options to change preferences for these options
(Del Missier et al., 2013). This finding is consistent with the
view that the framing bias occurs when people are over-
reliant on a simple frame derived from the surface structure
and valence of the problem (Kahneman and Frederick, 2007;
Maule and Villejoubert, 2007). Developing a more complex
frame that overcomes the bias requires complex processing in
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working memory; so people who have higher levels of processing
competency are better able to develop a more complex frame so
resist the framing bias.
Second, complex processing abilities associated with working
memory are also positively associated with the ability to
implement decision rules successfully (Del Missier et al., 2010,
2012, 2013). This finding suggests that individuals who are
better at complex processing are more able to undertake the
computations, comparisons and aggregations that underpin the
implementation of a decision rule. Successful implementation is
important if decision makers are to gain the adaptive advantage
that comes from using the optimal rule for the situation in hand
(Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2011).
Third, research shows that working memory related
processing competence is positively associated with the
calibration of human judgment (Del Missier et al., 2013).
Calibration is concerned with the extent to which people have
the correct degree of confidence in their judgments, e.g., when
they say they are 75% sure their judgment is correct they should
actually be correct 75% of the time. Research shows a general
tendency for people to be overconfident (Lichtenstein et al.,
1982). Overconfidence is a problem since it increases people’s
tendency to choose inappropriate risky options (McGraw et al.,
2004). The link between complex processing competency and
confidence is consistent with an explanation that assumes
people who reveal better calibrated judgments are more able to
engage in cognitively demanding strategies that take account of
disconfirming evidence relating to their initial judgment, rather
than being dependent on less demanding strategy that focuses
on confirming evidence alone (Koriat et al., 1980).
Fourth, research on the sunk cost effect shows that people
continue their commitment to failing courses of action beyond
the point they should (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). This effect
is due in part to them being unable to ignore the resources
already committed and not wanting to waste these by choosing
a different action. This contradicts a canon of rational decision
making—that sunk costs should be ignored, focusing instead
on future costs and benefits. There is evidence to suggest that
those that fall foul of this bias tend to be less competent in
terms of their knowledge in semantic memory. Fennema and
Perkins (2008) show that individuals who had previously taken
finance, accounting and management courses highlighting the
need to ignore sunk costs were less likely to fall foul of this
bias. A related and somewhat surprising finding is that when
differences in semantic memory competence are assessed using
general measures such as letter fluency, general knowledge and
vocabulary instead of actual knowledge about ignoring sunk
costs, those demonstrating higher levels of competency still show
reduced sunk cost effects (Del Missier et al., 2013).
Fifth, consistency in risk perception is related to semantic
memory competency. Findings show that an individual’s ability
to generate judgments that conform to the basic principles of
probability, e.g., the sum of the probabilities of all possible
outcomes is 1, is related to semanticmemory competence. Similar
to the research on sunk cost effects, the evidence for this effect
comes from research using proxy measures, i.e., letter fluency,
general knowledge and vocabulary rather than direct measures
of the knowledge about probability stored in semantic memory
(Del Missier et al., 2013).
Finally, research indicates that semantic memory competency
assessed in terms of the amount of domain knowledge people
have about an area can reduce the anchoring bias. In a series of
studies Smith et al. (2013) report that those with greater domain
knowledge show smaller anchoring effects. In one study they
showed that a group given domain relevant information later
showed less anchoring than a control group presented with no
information. It is noteworthy that this procedure is similar to that
used in just in case interventions and may provide a blueprint for
assessing the effectiveness of these intervention in the future.
These six areas show that decision effectiveness is influenced
by cognitive competencies with those individuals revealing
specific competencies being less likely to fall foul of particular
biases. Further support for these findings comes from studies
investigating the effects of age on cognitive competencies.
This work builds on research showing that as people grow
older they show increases in crystallized intelligence, i.e.,
experience and accumulated knowledge, but decreases in
fluid intelligence, i.e., the ability to generate, manipulate and
transform information (Salthouse, 2004). These differences
have led researchers to predict that older people will reveal
biases associated with complex processing to a greater extent
since working memory efficiency is strongly linked to fluid
intelligence. On the other hand, they should reveal biases
associated with knowledge in semantic memory to a lesser extent
since this memory component is strongly linked to crystallized
intelligence.
These predictions are broadly supported by research. For
example, older people are more susceptible to framing effects and
have greater difficulty implementing decision rules, but less likely
to succumb to sunk cost effects (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012b).
Although some studies fail to show these predicted effects (see
for example, Mayhorn et al., 2002), Li et al. (2013) explain these
anomalies in terms of a complimentary capabilities hypothesis
arguing that higher levels of crystallized intelligence can offset
reductions in fluid intelligence. In addition, Li et al. (2013)
highlight the value of using external memory aids to alleviate
processing loads for older adults. We believe that this is also
likely to be true for younger adults when faced with complicated
everyday decisions that require complex processing in working
memory. This will be particularly the case for those low in
complex processing competency.
The implications of these findings for developing and
evaluating just in time and just in case interventions are discussed
next.
Implications for Just in Time Interventions
Existing just in time decision aids are effective in part because
they support complex processing underpinning workingmemory
and executive control thereby increasing a decision maker’s
competency to deal with this aspect of decision making.
Interventions such as cognitive mapping and decision trees allow
decision makers to develop and maintain their representation of
a decision problem externally on paper or in computer software
rather than having to hold it in working memory. This frees
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up working memory capacity for other important activities
such as appraising and modifying the problem representation
and evaluating options to determine which to choose. These
interventions also reduce the processing demands by providing
guides about the sequence of activities needed to make a
decision rather than leaving decision makers to determine this
for themselves.
There are untested predictions from this line of reasoning.
First, just in time interventions that support complex working
memory processing such as cognitive mapping and decision trees
are likely to be effective in everyday situations where framing
and decision rule implementation pose difficulties for decision
makers. However, their impact should be less where framing
and decision rule implementation are relatively straightforward
and/or where the major cause of poor decision making involves
the lack of appropriate knowledge. In the latter situations
interventions linked to semantic memory competencies should
be more effective, e.g., just in case interventions. Second, just
in time interventions are likely to be particularly effective
for those individuals low in complex processing competencies,
including older people, given these interventions support this
processing.
Implications for Just in Case Interventions
Just in case interventions are effective in part because they deliver
important decision related information at one moment in time
that is stored in semantic memory so that it is available later when
a relevant decision situation arises. From this standpoint, just in
case decision aids can be thought to increase semantic memory
competence by providing the knowledge needed to make an
effective decision.
There are untested predictions from this line of reasoning.
First, just in case interventions should be effective in situations
where sunk costs, inconsistency in risk perception and anchoring
pose particular difficulties for decision makers since these biases
can be reduced by increased knowledge. However, just in case
interventions are unlikely to be effective in situations where, at
the moment of choice, there are heavy processing demands from
such activities as framing and decision rule implementation. This
view is consistent with suggestions by De Meza et al. (2008); they
suggest that a major limitation on the effectiveness of just in case
interventions is that they overlook the thinking and reasoning
processes involved at the moment of choice.
Second, just in case interventions are likely to be less
effective when individuals already have relevant knowledge
and experience; this includes older people since they have
had longer to acquire this knowledge. Third, just in case
interventions will be more effective when the information
presented is determined and delivered in ways that increase the
likelihood that it will be incorporated and retained in semantic
memory. Earlier we argued that the mental models approach is
designed in this way. By building on users’ existing knowledge,
supplementing gaps and correcting misapprehensions key
knowledge presented in an intervention is better integrated in
semantic memory so more likely to be available later at the point
of choice.
APPLYING COMPETENCE RESEARCH IN
PRESCRIPTIVE SETTINGS
Having shown the importance of cognitive competencies for our
understanding of just in time and just in case interventions,
in this section we outline two examples of how research on
one aspect of research, concerned with complex processing
in working memory, may be applied to improve existing
interventions.
Supporting Meta-Cognitive Process in
Learning Environments
A primary aim of research on meta-cognitive processes
in learning environments is to find ways of increasing
understanding of a problem and its solution by presenting
different external representations of the problem and support for
managing and integrating these representations internally (Renkl
et al., 2013). Limitations in working memory capacity make
integration difficult so researchers have developed procedures
designed to provide external support. For example, Schwonke
et al. (2009) investigated ways of integrating probability
equations and a tree diagram (very similar to a decision tree)
for understanding and solving probability problems. They show
that simply presenting different representations is not effective
because people have difficulty integrating them. Renkl et al.
(2013) review different ways to support complex processing
within working memory in order to facilitate integration. Two
of these are particularly relevant for this article.
First, self-explanation prompts ask individuals to explain
solution procedures to themselves while working through
a problem. This form of prompting builds on the self-
explanation effect—those that actively engage in explaining
solution procedures to themselves achieve better learning
outcomes (Chi et al., 1989). Berthold et al. (2009) argue that these
prompts facilitate the integration of different representations
of a problem and in doing so increase understanding of that
problem. However, they show that this only occurs in relatively
simple situations; in complex situations the processing demands
of these kinds of prompts exceed capacity limits so reduces rather
than increases understanding. They overcome this problem
by simplifying the activities involved in self-explanations, e.g.,
asking users to fill in blanks of statements about the relationship
between different representations of the problem rather than
prompting with open questions.
We believe that a similar procedure can help people develop
a requisite decision model when using decision trees to support
everyday decisions. A key element in developing a requisite
model is sensitivity testing where people vary their current
assessments of the probabilities and values associated with
particular outcomes. Simplified prompts have the potential to
support the complex processing necessary when generating and
integrating the outcomes of sensitivity testing. For example,
simple prompts with blanks for inserting judgments about
the highest and lowest possible outcome values can provide
support for developing a range of different models of the
problem when looking for the requisite model. In addition,
Phillips (1984) argues that a key element in determining
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if a model is requisite or not can be linked to feelings
of unease about the current model—these feelings signal
the need for further modeling. Again, prompting questions
about these feelings and how to interpret them can be
used to guide decision makers as to when their model is
requisite.
Second, goal-operator prompts are designed to help people
identify and explicate key sub-goals as they are being achieved.
Research shows that these prompts foster knowledge acquisition
in problem solving (Aleven and Koedinger, 2002) and improve
understanding of key aspects of problems (Schwonke et al.,
2009). In the context of decision trees this could involve
prompting decision makers to identify when a key sub-goal
has been completed, e.g., all possible outcomes that may follow
choice of an option have been identified. Research suggests
that these prompts facilitate understanding of the problem in
hand, and in doing so help in establishing a requisite decision
model.
These are just two examples of how research on facilitating
complex processing in working memory can be used to develop
a more effective just in time intervention based on decision trees.
There are likely to be many others.
Training on Increasing Working Memory
Capacity
Recent research has shown that working memory capacity can be
expanded through training. Morrison and Chein (2011) identify
two approaches. Strategy training teaches people strategies for
increasing the amount of information that can be retained in
working memory over time. It is domain specific—it focuses
on a particular component such as the rehearsal loop, uses
specific training procedures designed to improve the functioning
of that component and then evaluates the extent to which the
intervention improves the performance of that component. Core
training on the other hand is domain-general and typically
involves a battery of different cognitive activities. For example,
COGMED (Holmes et al., 2009) involves training based on a
battery of tasks such as backward digit span and visual tracking
and its effectiveness is measured across a wide range of general
cognitive tasks, e.g., tasks involving cognitive control, such as the
Stroop test and measures of fluid intelligence (Klingberg et al.,
2002). Changes in fluid intelligence are particularly important,
given the link between this and the use of cognitive heuristics
discussed earlier in this article. There is also evidence suggesting
that training benefits can still be present 6 months after training
(Holmes et al., 2009).
Core training may have the potential to facilitate just in case
interventions through improved learning of decision relevant
information. However, we believe that its greatest impact will
be on just in time interventions. The increased capacity derived
through training should lead to similar benefits to those described
earlier, i.e., those individuals with greater working memory
capacity will be less prone to particular biases such as the
framing bias and/or better able to implement decision rules
effectively.
However, some important issues about this research remain
unresolved (Morrison and Chein, 2011). For example, where a
battery of tasks is used it is difficult to determine which ones
are effective in inducing improvements in performance. Also,
research has often not ruled out the possibility that improvements
are simply placebo effects associated with people being more
motivated after training, rather than the training per se.
Despite these problems, working memory training seems to
have the potential for improving everyday decision making,
though research is needed to test this contention.
IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETENCIES
RESEARCH FOR AIDING DECISIONS
The central tenet of our argument is that the competencies
approach provides a different way of conceptualizing how and
why decision aids lead to better everyday decision making
and provides insights about how these interventions may be
improved and evaluated.
From this standpoint, just in time interventions such as
decision trees can be seen as enhancing a decision maker’s
competence to engage in complex processing underpinning
working memory. We have shown that thinking about just in
time aids in this way draws in other bodies of theory and research
hitherto neglected by those responsible for developing these
interventions. In particular, we have discussed how the use of
prompts and general working memory training can be used to
improve the effectiveness of just in time interventions.We believe
that these are two of what may be many such modifications.
Also, this approach provides different ways of evaluating these
interventions by testing the extent to which they reduce or
even eliminate those biases associated with complex processing
competence, e.g., the framing bias.
Similarly, just in case interventions can be seen as enhancing
a decision maker’s knowledge (semantic memory competence)
and experience (episodic memory competence). This suggests
that these aids can be enhanced by drawing on bodies of theory
and research on how these different memories operate and can
be enhanced. Earlier we discussed the mental models approach
(Morgan et al., 2002) which builds on users’ existing knowledge,
supplementing gaps and correcting misapprehensions rather
than simply presenting what domain experts think is necessary
(the standard practice from those developing just in case
interventions). This approach, which facilitates long term
retention, has been shown to improve decisions taken months
after an intervention is completed (Downs et al., 2004). We
believe that there are likely to be other competencies associated
with semantic and episodic memory that can be incorporated
in to just in case interventions. For example, remembering the
past, imagining the future, and engaging in mental simulation
processes (Greenberg and Verfaellie, 2010; Schacter et al., 2012)
are crucial to human decision making and are linked to episodic
memory competency (Del Missier et al., 2015).
In addition, this approach provides a distinctive way of
evaluating just in case interventions by testing the extent to
which they reduce or even eliminate those biases associated with
knowledge and experience, e.g., sunk cost and anchoring biases
while leaving those that are not, e.g., framing bias, unaffected.
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KNOWING WHICH INTERVENTION TO USE
Knowing which techniques are likely to be effective in a particular
decision situation is an enduring problem for those wishing to
support human decision making. The competencies approach
has the potential to provide some insights about how to solve
this problem. Del Missier et al. (2012) discuss how different
decision tasks draw on cognitive competencies to different
degrees. For example, complex processing competencies may be
more critical when the decision involves complex information
about options, consequences and other relevant information
(Dretsch and Tipples, 2008; DelMissier et al., 2010). This suggests
that just in time interventions are likely to be useful in these
kinds of decision situations. In contrast to this, other decisions
can be resolved using simpler strategies based either on learned
associations and simple heuristics (Glöckner and Witteman,
2010) or on specialist knowledge (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012b)
and recognition primed processes (Klein et al., 2010). The latter
two are particularly likely to draw on knowledge and experience
so are likely to be linked to competencies associated with episodic
and semanticmemory. Research is needed to develop a taxonomy
of everyday decision tasks in terms of the demands they place
on different cognitive processes and to test our predictions about
which kind of intervention is likely to be most effective for
improving decision making.
CONCLUSION
The competencies approach provides a different way of thinking
about when and why decision aids lead to better judgment
and decision making. It provides a way of developing and
evaluating just in time and just in case interventions based on
identifying and supporting the cognitive competencies necessary
to overcome known biases that occur in particular decision
situations.
Although these suggestions have considerable promise there
is a need for further research. For example, work is needed to
investigate further the idea that interventions such as cognitive
mapping and decision trees do indeed facilitate complex
cognitive processing; and, if so, whether they are effective at
eliminating biases linked with competencies associated with
complex processing such as the framing bias, difficulties
implementing decision rules and calibration but ineffective for
biases linked to knowledge and experience competencies such as
sunk costs and anchoring.
Similarly research is needed to test whether those just in
case interventions that are successful achieve this through
enhancing knowledge and experience based competencies and
are effective at reducing or eliminating biases such as sunk costs
and anchoring but ineffective for those associated with complex
processing competencies.
Research verifying these suggestions will not only provide
further support for the importance of cognitive competencies in
human decision making but also help us determine better which
interventions are likely to be effective in a particular everyday
decision making situations and why this is the case. This will
redress a lack of theory specifying how to match interventions
to problems.
The competencies approach may also have the potential to
help us develop new interventions based on principles related to
how best to improve the functioning of those aspects of cognition
that are crucial to the decision task in hand. We illustrated this
earlier by showing how working memory research can be used to
develop and test improvements in just in time and just in case
interventions.
We have focused only on cognitive competencies. Some key
competencies may be non-cognitive. For example, decision may
induce very strong emotions that may need to be regulated if
they are not to have a disruptive effect on the decision making
process (Castellanos et al., 2006). The importance of emotions
in determining decision biases has already been shown to be
crucial in sustaining the sunk cost bias (Bruine de Bruin et al.,
2014). Developing interventions that support emotion regulation
competencies may provide a very different but equally effective
approach to helping people make better everyday decisions in
situations that induce strong emotions.
Finally, the work reviewed in this article highlights the
need to re-establish the links between prescriptive and
descriptive decision research. On the one hand we have
shown how new developments in descriptive research can
provide: a different way of thinking about why decision aids
may be effective; a set of principles for modifying existing
decision aids; and suggest better ways of evaluating the
effectiveness of decision aids. On the other hand, we have
shown how prescriptive research can provide an effective test
bed to develop and evaluate theories drawn from prescriptive
research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Some of the work presented in this article was supported
financially by the UK Legal Services Board as part of a project
exploring how to help legal services consumers make better
decisions.
REFERENCES
Alba, J. W., and Hutchinson, W. J. (2000). Knowledge calibration: what consumers
know and what they think they know. J. Consum. Res. 27, 123–156. doi:
10.1086/314317
Aleven, V., and Koedinger, K. R. (2002). An effective meta-cognitive strategy:
learning by doing and explaining with a computer-based Cognitive Tutor.
Cogn. Sci. 26, 147–179. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2602_1
Arkes, H. R. (1991). Costs and benefits of judgment errors: implications
for debiasing. Psychol. Bull. 110, 486–498. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.110.
3.486
Arkes, H. R., and Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk costs. Organ. Behav.
Hum. Dec. 35, 125–140. doi: 10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4
Armitage, C. J., and Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned
behaviour: a meta-analytic review. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 471–499. doi:
10.1348/014466601164939
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1884
Maule and Maule Lay Decision Aiding and Thinking Competencies
Atkinson, A., McKay, S., Kempson, E., and Collard, S. (2006). Levels of Financial
Capability in the UK: Results of a Baseline Survey. London: Financial Services
Authority.
Becker, M. H. (1974). The health belief model and personal health behaviour.
Health Educ. Mon. 2, 324–473.
Bekker, H. L., Hewison, J., and Thornton, J. G. (2004). Applying decision analysis
to facilitate informed decision making about prenatal diagnosis for Down
syndrome: a randomised controlled trial. Prenat. Diagn. 24, 265–275. doi:
10.1002/pd.851
Bekker, H. L., Thornton, J. G., Airey, C. M., Connelly, J. B., Hewison, J., Robinson,
M. B., et al. (1999). Informed decision making: an annotated bibliography and
systematic review. Health Technol. Assess. 3, 1–156.
Berthold, K., Eysink, T. H., and Renkl, A. (2009). Assisting self-explanation
prompts are more effective than open prompts when learning with multiple
representations. Instr. Sci. 37, 345–363. doi: 10.1007/s11251-008-9051-z
Bruine de Bruin,W., Del Missier, F., and Levin, I. P. (2012a). Individual differences
in decision-making competence. J. Behav. Decis. Making 25, 329–330. doi:
10.1002/bdm.753
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., and Fischhoff, B. (2012b). Explaining adult
age differences in decision-making competence. J. Behav. Decis. Making 25,
352–360. doi: 10.1002/bdm.712
Bruine de Bruin,W., Strough, J.-N., and Parker, A. M. (2014). Getting older isn’t all
that bad: better decisions and coping when facing “sunk costs” Psychol. Aging
29, 642–647. doi: 10.1037/a0036308
Castellanos, F. X., Sonuga-Barke, E. J. S., Milham, M. P., and Tannock, R. (2006).
Characterizing cognition in ADHD: beyond executive dysfunction. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 117–123. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.01.011
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W, Reimann, P., and Glaser, R. (1989).
Self explanations: how students study and use examples in learning to solve
problems. Cogn. Sci. 13, 145–182. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog1302_1
Clemen, R., and Kwit, R. (2001). The value of decision analysis at Eastman Kodak
Company, 1990–1999. Interfaces 31, 74–92. doi: 10.1287/inte.31.5.74.9655
DelMissier, F., Mäntylä, T., and Bruine de Bruin,W. (2010). Executive functions in
decision making: an individual differences approach. Think Reason. 16, 69–97.
doi: 10.1080/13546781003630117
Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., and Bruine de Bruin, W (2012). Decision making
competence, executive functioning, and general cognitive abilities. J. Behav.
Decis. Making 25, 331–351. doi: 10.1002/bdm.731
Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., Hansson, P., Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., and
Nilsson, L. (2013). The multifold relationship between memory and decision
making: an individual-differences study. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 39, 1344–1364.
doi: 10.1037/a0032379
Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., and Nilsson, L. G. (2015). “Aging, memory, and
decision making,” in Aging and Decision Making: Empirical and Applied
Perspectives, eds T. M. Hess, C. E. Loeckenhoff, and J.-N. Strough (London:
Elsevier Academic Press), 127–148. doi: 10.1016/b978-0-12-417148-0.00007-8
De Meza, D., Irlenbusch, B., and Reyniers, D. (2008). Financial Capability: A
Behavioural Economics Perspective. London: Financial Services Authority.
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R., and Vlaev, I. (2012).
Influencing behaviour: the mindspace way. J. Econ. Psychol. 33, 264–277. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.009
Dougherty, M. R. P., and Hunter, J. E. (2003). Hypothesis generation, probability
judgment, and individual differences in working memory capacity. Acta
Psychol. 113, 263–282. doi: 10.1016/S0001-6918(03)00033-7
Downs, J. S., Murray, P. J., Bruine de Bruin, W, White, J. P., Palmgren, C.,
and Fischhoff, B. (2004). Interactive video behavioral intervention to reduce
adolescent females’ STD risk: a randomized controlled trial. Soc. Sci. Med. 59,
1561–1572. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.01.032
Dretsch, M. N., and Tipples, J. (2008). Working memory involved in predicting
future outcomes based on past experiences. Brain Cogn. 66, 83–90. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2007.05.006
Edwards, A., Elwyn, G., Covey, J., Matthews, E., and Pill, R. (2001).
Presenting risk information—a review of the effects of “framing” and other
manipulations on patient outcomes. J. Health Commun. 6, 61–82. doi:
10.1080/10810730150501413
Evans, J. S. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and
social cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 255–278. doi: 10.1146/annurev.
psych.59.103006.093629
Evans, J. S. (2010). Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fennema, M. G., and Perkins, J. D. (2008). Mental budgeting versus
marginal decision making: training, experience and justification effects on
decisions involving sunk costs. J. Behav. Decis. Making 21, 225–239. doi:
10.1002/bdm.585
Fernandes, D. J. G., Lynch, J. G., andNetemeyer, R. G. (2014). The effect of financial
literacy and financial education on downstream financial behaviour. Manage
Sci. 60, 1861–1883. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1849
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight 6= foresight: the effect of outcome knowledge
on judgment under uncertainty. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. 1, 288–299. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.288
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., and Lichtenstein, S. (1978). Fault trees: sensitivity of
estimated failure probabilities to problem representation. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
4, 339–359. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.4.2.330
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., and O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting
and time preference: a critical review. J. Econ. Litt. 40, 351–401. doi:
10.1257/jel.40.2.351
French, S., Maule, A. J., and Papamichail, N. (2009). Decision Behaviour, Analysis
and Support. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gigerenzer, G., and Brighton, H. (2011). “Homo heuristicus: why biased minds
make better inferences,” in Heuristics: The Foundations ofAdaptive Behaviour,
eds G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, and T. Pachur (New York: Oxford University
Press), 2–27.
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glanz, K., Rimer, B. K., and Viswanath, K. (2008). Health Behaviour and Health
Education. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Glöckner, A., and Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: a
categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision
making. Think Reason. 16, 1–25. doi: 10.1080/13546780903395748
Greenberg, D. L., and Verfaellie, M. (2010). Interdependence of episodic and
semantic memory: evidence from neuropsychology. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc.
16, 748–753. doi: 10.1017/S1355617710000676
Gregory, W L., Cialdini, R. B., and Carpenter, K. M. (1982). Self-relevant
scenarios as mediators of likelihood estimates and compliance: does imagining
make it so? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 43, 88–99. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.
43.1.89
Guala, F., and Mittone, L. (2015). A political justification of nudging. Rev. Philipp.
Psychol. 6, 385–395. doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0241-8
Hadar, L., Sood, S., and Fox, C. R. (2013). Subjective knowledge in consumer
financial decisions. J. Marketing Res. 50, 303–316. doi: 10.1509/jmr.
10.0518
Harré, B. D. (1976). “The constructive role of models,” in The Use of Models in the
Social Sciences, ed L. Collins (London: Tavistock Publications), 16–43.
Hodgkinson, G. P., Bown, N. J., Maule, A. J., Glaister, K. W, and Pearman, A.
D. (1999). Breaking the frame: an analysis of strategic cognition and decision
making under uncertainty. Strateg. Manage J. 20, 977–985.
Holmes, J., Gathercole, S. E., and Dunning, D. L. (2009). Adaptive training leads
to sustained enhancement of poor working memory in children. Dev. Sci. 12,
F9–F15. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00848.x
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Allen Lane.
Kahneman, D., and Frederick, S. (2007). Frames and brains: elicitation
and control of response tendencies. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 45–46. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.007
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1984). Choice, values, and frames. Am. Psychol.
39, 341–350. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., and Clinton Cirocco, A. (2010). Rapid decision making
on the fire ground: the original study plus a postscript. J. Cogn. Eng. Decis.
Making 4, 186–209. doi: 10.1518/155534310X12844000801203
Klingberg, T., Forssberg, H., and Westerberg, H. (2002). Training of working
memory in children with ADHD. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsyc. 24, 781–791. doi:
10.1076/jcen.24.6.781.8395
Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S., and Fischhoff, B. (1980). Reasons for confidence. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. 6, 107–118. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.2.107
Larrick, R. P. (2004). “Debiasing,” in The Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and
Decision Making, eds D. J. Koehler and N. Harvey (Malden, MA: Blackwell),
461–480.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1884
Maule and Maule Lay Decision Aiding and Thinking Competencies
LeBoeuf, R. A., and Shafir, E. (2003). Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on
the susceptibility to framing effects. J. Behav. Decis. Making 16, 77–92. doi:
10.1002/bdm.433
Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., and Phillips, L. D. (1982). “Calibration of
probabilities: the state of the art to 1980,” in Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, eds D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 306–344.
Li, Y., Baldassi, M., Johnson, E. J., and Weber, E. U. (2013). Complementary
cognitive capabilities, economic decision making, and aging. Psychol. Aging 28,
595–613. doi: 10.1037/a0034172
Mackie, L. (2013). Legal Capability for Everyday Life. London: Law for Life.
Maule, A. J., and Villejoubert, G. (2007). What lies beneath: reframing framing
effects. Think Reason. 13, 25–44. doi: 10.1080/13546780600872585
Mayhorn, C. B., Fisk, A. D., and Whittle, J. D. (2002). Decision, decisions: analysis
of age, cohort, and time of testing on framing of risky decision options. Hum.
Factors 44, 515–521. doi: 10.1518/0018720024496935
McGraw, A. P., Mellers, B. A., and Ritov, I. (2004). The affective costs of
overconfidence. J. Behav. Decis. Making 17, 281–295. doi: 10.1002/ bdm.472
Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A., and Atman, C. J. (2002).
Risk Communication: A Mental Models Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Morrison, A. B., and Chein, J. M. (2011). Does working memory training work?
The promise and challenges of enhancing cognition by training working
memory. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 18, 46–60. doi: 10.3758/s13423-010-0034-0
Mussweiler, T., Strack, F., and Pfeiffer, T. (2000). Overcoming the
inevitable anchoring effect: considerating the opposite compensates for
selective accessibility. Pers. Soc. Psychol. B 26, 1142–1150. doi: 10.1177/
01461672002611010
O’Connor, A. M., Bennett, C. L., Stacey, D., Barry, M., Col, N. F., Eden,
K., et al. (2009). Decision aids for people facing health treatment or
screening decisions. Cochrane Database Syst. Rev. 8:CD001431. doi: 10.1002/
14651858.CD001431.pub2
O’Connor, A. M., Rostom, A., Fiset, V, Tetroe, J., Entwistle, V, Llewellyn-
Thomas, H., et al. (1999). Decision aids for patients facing health treatment
or screening decisions: a systematic review. Br. Med. J. 319, 731–734. doi:
10.1136/bmj.319.7212.731
Parker, A. M., and Fischhoff, B. (2005). Decision-making competence: external
validation through an individual-differences approach. J. Behav. Decis. Making
18, 1–27. doi: 10.1002/bdm.481
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., and Johnson, E. J. (1993). The Adaptive Decision
Maker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Phillips, L. D. (1984). A theory of requisite decision models. Acta Psychol. 56,
29–48. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(84)90005-2
Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choice Under
Uncertainty. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Renkl, A., Berthold, K., Grosse, C. S., and Schwonke, R. (2013). “Making better
use of multiple representations: how fostering metacognition can help,” in
International Handbook of Metacognition and Learning Technologies, eds R.
Azevedo and V. Aleven (New York: Springer), 397–408.
Reyna, V. F., Lloyd, F. J., and Brainerd, C. J. (2003). “Memory, development,
and rationality: an integrative theory of judgment and decision making,” in
Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research, eds S. Schneider
and J. Shanteau (New York: Cambridge University Press), 201–245. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511609978.009
Salthouse, T. A. (2004). What and when of cognitive aging. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.
13, 140–144. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00293.x
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., Hassabis, D.,Martin, V. C., Spreng, R. N., and Szpunar,
K. (2012). The future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain.
Neuron 76, 677–694. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001
Schwonke, R., Berthold, K., and Renkl, A. (2009). How multiple external
representations are used and how they can be made more useful. Appl. Cogn.
Psychol. 23, 1227–1243. doi: 10.1002/acp.1526
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioural model of rational choice.Q. J. Econ. 69, 99–118.
doi: 10.2307/1884852
Smith, A. R., Windschitl, P. D., and Bruchmann, K. (2013). Knowledge matters:
anchoring effects are moderated by knowledge level. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 43,
97–108. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.1921
Thaler, R. H. (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics.
NewYork: W. W. Norton & Company.
Thaler, R. H., and Sunstein, C. R. (2008).Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging
frequency and probability. Cognit. Psychol. 5, 207–232. doi: 10.1016/0010-
0285(73)90033-9
Ubel, P. (2013). “Beyond comprehension: figuring out whether decision aids
improve people’s decisions,” in The Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy,
ed E. Shafir (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress), 351–360.
van Rooij, M. C. J., Lusardi, A., and Alessie, R. J. M. (2011). Financial literacy
and retirement planning in the Netherlands. J. Econ. Psychol. 32, 593–608. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2011.02.004
Watson, S. R. (1992). The presumptions ofprescription.Acta Psychol. 80, 7–31. doi:
10.1016/0001-6918(92)90038-F
Weber, E. U., and Johnson, E. J. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60, 53–85. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633
Winkleby, M. A. (1994). The future of community-based cardiovascular
disease intervention studies. Am. J. Public Health 84, 1369–1372. doi:
10.2105/AJPH.84.9.1369
Yates, J. F., Veinott, E. S., and Patalano, A. L. (2003). “Hard decisions, bad
decisions: on decision quality and decision aiding,” in Emerging Perspectives on
Judgment and Decision Research, eds S. Schneider and J. Shanteau (NewYork:
Cambridge University Press), 13–63.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Maule and Maule. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1884
